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Abstract: This essay explores profound alterations in constructions of children, arguing 
that the twists and turns of history reveal a stark need for deeper theological reflection.  
In particular, it traces a move from the premodern child as imperfectible in a fallen world 
to the modern child as perfectible in an imperfect world to the postmodern child as 
imperfect, even potentially volatile, in an imperfect, volatile world.  This shift invites 
serious moral and theological reconsideration, including grappling anew with classical 
doctrines of sin and grace. 
 
My research and writing as a Luce Fellow has centered on the question of how to 
raise children faithfully as a feminist Christian in a complex postmodern society.  In this 
single sentence, I juxtapose four elements that do not sit easily together—Christianity, 
feminism, children, and postmodernity.  I am convinced, however, that much is gained 
from this juxtaposition.  As a Christian feminist mother of three boys, my research 
naturally emerged out of my own personal frustrations with the limitations of mainline 
Christian and feminist views of children and, at the same time, my conviction that both 
Christianity and feminist theology have important insights to offer.   
Whereas my personal frustrations are widely shared, my confidence in 
Christianity and feminism is less so.  On a personal level, many people, regardless of 
class, race, or religious tradition, find that parenthood is a vocation under siege and that 
the formation of children is a task for which they are largely unprepared.  And on a social 
level, there is a growing public concern about children.  But most people today seldom 
see Christianity as a credible or relevant resource, either in terms of congregational 
guidance or academic theological insight.  And when it comes to child rearing advice, 
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feminists do not fare much better.  It has been hard for feminists, both secular and 
religious, to avoid the pitfall of placing women and children’s needs against one another.   
Dogged pursuit of my question has therefore required several steps common to 
fundamental practical theology, from descriptive, historical, and analytical investigation 
to more constructive efforts.  In this paper, I attend to only one slice of this research.  I 
turn to an area where I found myself both surprised and intrigued—my historical 
investigation of the cultural construction of children and the reconstructive theological 
efforts that this historical study invites.  The twists and turns of history reveal a stark 
need for much deeper theological reflection on how we think and talk about children 
today.  The images and realities of childhood are under radical reconstruction and this 
reconstruction inevitably spills over into important moral and theological understandings. 
 
Historical Roots of Child-Rearing Anxieties 
An intense anxiety surrounds the question of how to bring up children today.  
Mainline congregations and academic theology have paid little attention to either this 
anxiety or to its historical roots, even though these roots are inextricably entwined around 
deep moral and religious quandaries.   
The anxiety about raising children is a direct outcome of a series of “domestic 
revolutions,” as historians Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg call the far-reaching 
transformations in American family life of the last three centuries.1  Profound alterations 
in demographic, organizational, functional, and social characteristics of the Western 
family have raised what might be called the “Child Question”: What will become of 
children in a greatly changed world in which they no longer seem to fit easily or well? ”2 
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Economic Shifts: Children as Asset or Burden? 
Last year, on an elementary school field trip to a 4-H agricultural center, I listened 
as a woman explained the processes of dairy production on a farm in bygone years to two 
classrooms of third-grade children.  She displayed an antique butter-churn and several 
other implements used to get butter from cow to table.  Who, she asked, did they think 
churned the butter?  Blank stares led her to hint, “Do you have chores?”  “No” was the 
resounding chorus of about fifty 8-9 year olds.  In the distribution of farm labor not all 
that long ago, as it turns out, children close to their age churned the butter.  That children 
no longer see themselves as directly responsible for family welfare may seem like a small 
matter.  But in actuality it exemplifies a sea-change of great proportions.  
One of the best known and widely debated theories about childhood is that of 
historian Philip Ariès.  He saw the “idea of childhood” as a “discovery” of the 
seventeenth century.  Until that time, childhood was not considered a distinct 
developmental stage.  Children were perceived largely as tiny adults or at least as adults 
in the making.3  Scholars of all sorts have contested these claims, demonstrating a real 
appreciation for childhood prior to the modern period.  Perhaps a poor English translation 
of Ariès’s French term “sentiment” as simply “idea” has contributed to the confusion.4  
By “sentiment,” he did not necessarily mean that childhood itself did not exist; rather 
childhood did not carry the emotional freight that it has acquired since that time.  The 
debate over historical accuracy aside, however, Ariès was right on at least two accounts.  
Each historical period fashions its own unique attitudes toward children.  And, equally 
important, a profound change occurred with the advent of modernity.  Modernity raised 
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new questions about a child’s place in society that have plagued parents up to the present 
day. 
What is it about the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and today’s 
continued technological and social innovations that has displaced and continues to 
displace children?  Why have the developments of the last few centuries made it harder 
and harder for families to deal with their responsibilities? 
Although in premodern and early modern times children remained subordinates in 
a highly structured, patriarchal family, they had essential roles.  As soon as they were old 
enough, they took their place in family industries, weeding and hoeing gardens, herding 
domestic animals, carding and spinning wool, making clothing, and caring for younger 
brothers and sisters.  The seventeenth-century American family in general existed as a 
more cohesive whole, bringing together under one roof the labors of economic 
production, domestic life, social interaction, and political participation.  As family 
historian John Demos puts it, “All could feel—could see—the contributions of the others; 
and all could feel the underlying framework of reciprocity.”5  While children may have 
had to submit to the sometimes arbitrary authority of harsh fathers or weary mothers, they 
knew where they stood in relationship to the family’s well being.  They were a part of the 
struggle to survive and thrive. 
With the advent of industrialization, men became breadwinners and women 
largely became homemakers in ever more exclusive ways.  Most accounts stop here.  But 
what about children?  With work and family split into public and private worlds, children, 
like women, lost their place as contributing members of household economies and, later 
in life, as insurance for aging parents.  This shift occurred more slowly for girls and for 
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working-class and slave children whose labor in textile mills and coal mines or as field 
and domestic workers initially made it possible for while middle-class mothers and 
children to retreat to a private realm.  Eventually, however, with emancipation, 
mandatory education, and child labor laws in the last century, the end result was much 
the same for almost all U.S. children.  No longer participants in home industries or 
farmed out as servants and apprentices and eventually banned from factories, children no 
longer increased a family’s chances of survival but instead drained limited resources.  
While appropriately freed from exploitative labor, their position in the family changed 
dramatically from asset to burden.  Parents simply no longer expected children to be 
useful.   
Today’s parents resist the idea of children as workers.  Yet, ironically, an inverse 
commodification of the child has become increasingly harder to resist.  As if parents need 
any reminder of the costs, estimates of the expense of raising a child make regular news 
headlines.  In 1980, not that long before my oldest son was born in 1986, children, it was 
reported, would cost parents between $100,000 and $140,000.  This public pricing of 
children as a major family liability, something foreign less than a century ago, epitomizes 
the revolution that has occurred in daily life. 
 
Psychological Overcompensation: Children as Emotionally Priceless and Yet Invisible 
This sweeping historical change, however, does not necessarily mean that 
children were any less cherished.  To the contrary. What would become of children now?  
From the nineteenth century until today, children became even more precious in a new 
way.  Ironically enough, the more productively useless children became and the less 
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valuable in the “real” world, the more emotionally priceless they became within the 
home.6  With the benefits of children less obvious, their desirability and even presence in 
the family required fresh explanation.  Almost as if overcompensating for expelling 
children from the adult world, debates about the nature and amount of attention adults 
should lavish on them have raged in the years since industrialization.  New social science 
experts on the intricacies of child rearing, aided by theologians like Horace Bushnell on 
the true nature of Christian sacrificial love, happily offered variations on an answer.  
Children were to be inordinately and unconditionally loved in the private sphere of home 
and family—that is, loved without any limit on private parental excess or expectation of 
return on the child’s part. 
The early nineteenth century saw a glorification of motherhood often described as 
the “cult of womanhood,” extolling the piety, purity, and passivity of wives and mothers.  
Every bit as captivating and virulent was the “cult of childhood” and the obsession with 
child rearing. The very idea that improper maternal love could permanently harm a 
child’s development, dictating how they would turn out as adults, was virtually unheard 
of in the Middle Ages.7  But by early modernity, children were idealized as precious, 
delicate, and in need of constant care.  “Only the most careful and moral ‘rearing,’” 
observes Demos, “would bring the young out safe in later life; anything less might 
imperil their destiny irrevocably.”8   
That the child prized did not mean, however, that children assumed center stage.  
Throughout these domestic revolutions of the last several generations, children moved 
farther and farther from the center of adult activity and more and more into a separate, 
privatized realm of home and school.  Children not only lost steady contact with parents; 
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they lost contact with the wider world of nonfamily adults.  The family’s purpose itself 
became increasingly defined around personal desires, shifting progressively from the 
parent-child relationship to the couple.9  The redefined family goals of emotional 
companionship and fulfillment did not fit all that well with one of the results of intimate 
love—children.  In fact, it was not too hard to see the demands of raising children as an 
impediment to these goals.  Long before the feminism of the mid-twentieth century, 
therefore, parenting and children began to lose their ascribed status in the larger scheme 
of adult life.10  Children were to “be seen but not heard.”  This English proverb was not 
recorded before the nineteenth century, according to one dictionary of quotations, even 
though it was familiar “with maids in place of children” since the 1400s.11  Regardless of 
its exact origin, its familiar ring even today speaks a thousand words about the 
marginalization of “inferiors,” women and servants certainly, but especially children in 
modern society.  In the adult business of modernity, adults gaze upon children with 
adoration but children had better keep quiet.   
Even the artifacts used by and for children reveal the need to create a separate, 
restricted place for them.  In a fascinating study of changes in the material culture 
surrounding child rearing, historian Karin Calvert observes that “most children’s 
furniture of the seventeenth century was designed to stand babies up and propel them 
forward” into adulthood and away from the precariousness of early childhood.  By 
contrast, by the middle of the nineteenth century cribs, high chairs, and perambulators 
replaced the objects designed to assimilate children rapidly into adult society.  These new 
inventions served instead as barriers, carefully establishing a child’s special sphere 
separate from the adult realm.  Infant furnishing was designed to “hold infants down and 
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contain them in one spot.”12  These differences reveal a change in where parents saw 
danger.  Before parents located life’s major threat in childhood with its dangers of 
disease, sin, and death.  The sooner parents could usher children through childhood the 
better.  In the nineteenth century the danger moved to adulthood with its threat of worldly 
contamination.  Childhood then emerged as a safe haven and the longer children 
remained there the better.     
 Even demographically, children have come to occupy an ever-shrinking place in 
adult lives.  In the nineteenth century, only about 20 percent of families did not have 
children under 18 years old.  By 1991, at least 42 percent of all families did not include 
children.13  The one most common living arrangement in the U.S. in 1998 was unmarried 
people and no children, doubling in just a few decades from 16 percent of all families in 
1972 to 32 percent.  In the twenty-first century, as more choose to postpone marriage or 
remain single and childless and as those who bear children live longer after their children 
leave home, a majority of households will not include children. 14 
It is the state of poor children, however, that most epitomizes the problem of the 
displacement of children from public view.  The private sentimentalization of children 
and child rearing, it seems, has been inversely related to a collective indifference toward 
other people’s children. The contradictions are grim.  Some four-to-twelve year olds have 
almost five billion dollars in discretionary income from gifts, allowances, and chores, 
while a fourth of the nation’s children live in poverty.  Middle-class parents invest in 
private schools and educational tax-deferred funds while poor parents buy burial 
coverage for their child’s premature death.  The U.S. economy grew by approximately 20 
percent in the 1980s as four million more children moved into poverty, making up the 
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largest proportion of poor persons in the U.S.  As Daniel Patrick Moynihan remarks, 
“there is no equivalent in our history for such a number or such a proportion.”15 
 
Moral and Religious Quandaries: Children as Depraved or Innocent? 
Hand in hand with these redefinitions of the child as productively useless but 
emotionally priceless and yet increasingly invisible was the redefinition of the child as 
morally and spiritually innocent.  That is, childhood was also erased as a vital moral and 
religious phase of human development.  In part, this was an inevitable consequence of 
who responded to the “Child Question.”  In all the fuss over what would become of 
children, social scientists more than church leaders and theologians began to provide the 
answers.  In one of the most striking inversions of the last three centuries, largely secular 
ideas replaced fundamentally religious approaches to child rearing.  The theologians who 
did continue to speak about children, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher or Bushnell, were 
mostly happy to comply with the ideas of philosophers and scientists on the child’s 
nature.  Beyond this, most theologians did not even try to address the topic at all.   
Prior to the eighteenth century, parents may have treated the care of children 
casually, but attention to a child’s moral and religious development was anything but 
casual. A parent’s primary task was to suppress and control what was seen as a child’s 
natural depravity.  Children entered the world as carriers of “original sin,” an affliction 
associated with pride, self, and above all, will.  They, like adults, encountered daily 
temptations but without the aid of adult religious disciplines of self-scrutiny and self-
regulation.  Hence, religious advice-literature urged “breaking” and “beating down” of 
the will by the heads of households through weekly catechism, daily prayer and scripture 
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reading, repeated admonitions, and sometimes intense psychological and even physical 
reprimand.16  
By the end of the eighteenth century, fewer people accepted this portrayal.  The 
child’s mind is a blank slate, philosopher John Locke argued, upon which anything may 
be imprinted.  The child is by nature social and affectionate, not sinful, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau said.  By the mid-nineteenth century the emphasis had almost entirely shifted 
(although certainly not within all circles).  Children were now defined as morally neutral, 
even “innocent” and “sacralized.”  One of the most powerful illustrations of this shift 
appears in the evolution of children’s portraits.  In colonial representations, children of 
the upper class wear grown-up fashions and adopt regal stances, with hands on hips and 
one leg extended, designed to indicate their future adult status.  By the mid-eighteenth 
century, such personifications of adultlike children were replaced by the endearing, soft 
image of the naturally innocent child.  Children were endowed with an almost celestial 
goodness, pure and unsullied by worldly corruption. This “Romantic child,” art historian 
Anne Higonnet declares, “simply did not exist before the modern era.”17        
This change marks a major shift in understandings of moral agency and 
accountability.  In the premodern view of imperfect children in a fallen world, 
responsibility for human evil and failure was more evenly distributed among child, 
parents, community, church, and society.  With the rise of perfectible children in an 
imperfect world, blame for problems increasingly moved away from the child.  As one 
historian puts it, “As God’s sovereignty lessened, parental responsibility increased.”18  As 
a child’s moral duties shrank, maternal moral obligation expanded accordingly.  Parents 
were obliged to protect children from social threats, of which there seemed to be 
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increasingly more.  Emotional nurture more than moral and religious guidance would 
bring about independence, self-initiative, and creativity, the skills that seemed necessary 
for success in a modernized society instead of obedience to authority.  If children 
demonstrated selfishness or aggression, the reason was that they were being improperly 
cared for and not something inherent to their moral or spiritual nature.  
Bushnell, the most prominent theologian to address child rearing in the nineteenth 
century, kindly offered religious justification for this shift.  His book, Christian Nurture, 
deified the household and Christianized emotional nurture.  A child is still born 
spiritually and morally disabled, but a faithful family environment offered a handy 
remedy.  In fact, every act of parental care, every word and deed, mattered.  Devotion to 
one’s own children could itself be justified as salvific.19  
But if child-rearing problems were no longer related so much to sin as to 
emotional needs, who cared any longer what theologians had to say?  Gradually parents 
looked less and less to the church and more and more to secular experts. In an innovation 
unique to the twentieth century, all facets of childcare received attention in the laboratory 
centers attached to major universities, such as Yale, Cornell, and Minnesota.  Child 
experts now included not only pediatricians, psychologists, psychiatrists and educators 
but also sociologists and anthropologists.20  Childcare manuals became the new “Bibles” 
for proper motherhood, climaxing in the mid-twentieth century with Dr. Spock.  The 
best-selling1968 edition of Baby and Child Care was released after 179 previous 
paperback printings of the original 1945 edition.  The book sold millions of copies. 
Without using Freud’s technical terms, Spock popularized Freudian assumptions about 
the absolutely crucial importance of the early years for a child’s future.21 This pattern of 
 12
seeing faulty child rearing as the source of delinquency, poverty, violence, and other 
major social problems continues today.  In Dr. Spock’s world, the household required a 
kind of scientific engineering and ingenuity.  Housekeeping became a matter of home 
economics and interior design; child rearing became a job that could be methodically 
mastered and even perfected.  
In the past half-century, science became obsessed with a peculiarly modern 
question: Why do children turn out the way they do?  Social scientific debates about 
nature and nurture largely replaced moral and religious debates about innocence and 
depravity.  Judith Harris, author of the much-discussed The Nurture Assumption, claims 
that nature and nurture, what psychology used to call heredity and environment, are the 
“the yin and yang, the Adam and Eve, the Mom and Pop of pop psychology.”22   Parents 
in turn became more and more hung up about doing the right thing, having been led by 
science into believing that children and parents are perfectible, infinitely open to human 
design, rather than flawed and imperfect.  Today many middle-class parents have taken 
the mandate to lavish the very best on one’s own children to an extreme, intensely 
apprehensive about how one’s own individual children will turn out.  Significantly, this 
preoccupation is focused on fewer and fewer children: the number of children per 
household has dropped from 6.6 in 1890 to 1.9 in 1994.23  Like a silent spiritual 
contagion, this preoccupation and the inevitability of failure has spread from mothers to 
fathers, single parents, stepparents, grandparents, and even siblings.   
No wonder recent books challenging this obsession and taking an extreme 
opposite position sell so many copies. Harris’s book itself argues that psychology has 
tricked us: peers matter, children socialize other children, but parents are basically not 
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responsible.  She concludes a chapter on “What Parents Can Do” with an especially 
gratifying section titled “The Guilt Trip Stops Here” that reads like a recipe to ease our 
heavy load.  Similarly, education consultant John Bruer received all sorts of hype when 
he challenged the “myth” that the family environment during the first three years alters 
brain development.24  Jerome Kegan likewise declared the idea that the first two years 
determine a child’s development seductively false.25  Do any of these books, however, 
offer satisfactory answers to the deeper moral and spiritual questions that have now 
arisen about what children need and adult responsibility for children?  Unfortunately, 
questions about guilt, responsibility, and children can no longer be so easily resolved. 
 
A Place for Theology?  Children as Moral and Religious Agents 
We stand now in the midst of a major reconstruction in our understandings of 
children.  This reconstruction is on the “same order of magnitude,” Higonnet believes, as 
that which occurred with the romanticization of the child in the eighteenth century, a 
portrayal of childhood that has now run its course.26  Just as the new construction of 
innocent childhood caused anxiety, resistance, and innovation in its time, so also does the 
reinvention of childhood today.   
Three negative images dominate contemporary views of children—the Hurried 
child, the Market child, and the Neglected or Endangered child.27  Beyond assessing the 
problems of the child who must check a daily planner before deciding to play with a 
friend or the child bombarded by advertisements as the next big growth market, it is 
equally important to ask why these images have taken over.  They are desperate, even if 
poor, cultural attempts to figure out where and how children will now fit into postmodern 
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life.  These views are particularly disturbing because they upset cherished nineteenth-
century conventions of idyllic childhood, revealing the artificiality and limitations of the 
invention of childhood innocence.  Moreover, they contest the sharp line drawn between 
adult and child worlds.  They show the inevitable and sometimes severe consequences for 
children of adult actions in the so-called separate adult realm, and they insist that adults 
once again take children’s lives more seriously, including their moral and religious 
struggles.  Together these images point toward a more apt characterization of postmodern 
children.  We have moved irrevocably beyond the sentimental toward some other vision, 
what Higonnet calls “Knowing children.” 
In place of the ideal of the innocent child, Knowing children call into question 
children’s “psychic and sexual innocence by attributing to them consciously active minds 
and bodies.”28  The ideology of innocence meant that adults saw children as cute but less 
often as capable, intelligent, desiring individuals in their own right.  Innocence allowed 
adults to picture children as passive, trivial, and even available to adult objectification 
and abuse.  Absolute distinctions between adult and child especially stranded adolescents, 
as if they ought to metamorphose overnight from one to the other and spare adults the 
real complexity of human life.  More than anything, however, the more realistic, less 
romanticized Knowing child mixes together sexual, moral, and spiritual attributes 
previously dichotomized.  The Romantic child defined children in terms of what adults 
were not—“not sexual, not vicious, not ugly, not conscious, not damaged.”  The 
Knowing child presents a less simple alternative.  As Higonnet remarks, children are as 
much about “difficulty, trouble, and tension” as they are about “celebration, admiration, 
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and passionate attachment.”  This confronts adults with “many more challenges as well as 
many more pleasures than any idea of childhood has done before.”29 
The image of the Knowing child suggests an intriguing return of moral and 
religious questions.  If the premodern family portrayed the child as imperfectible in a 
fallen world and the modern world saw the child as perfectible in an imperfect world, the 
postmodern child is perhaps the most morally and spiritually perplexing: the imperfect, 
even potentially volatile, child in an imperfect, volatile world.  Recent events, such as 
child-on-child violence and school shootings, have raised serious questions about how to 
judge the moral and spiritual capacities of children and the responsibilities of adults.  At 
the same time, children seem all the more vulnerable.  By picturing children as innocent, 
blank slates, adults often abused their responsibility for earnest protection of children’s 
physical, moral, and spiritual well being.  Adults can no longer avoid their obligations to 
oversee children’s moral and spiritual development by surrounding themselves with 
pictures of cuddly, unblemished, blissful infants.   
In a word, a rich moral and religious complexity has returned along with the 
honesty and real ambiguity of children and parenting.  How well do children really know 
what they need?  Are their desires as susceptible as adult desires to the human temptation 
of wanting too much or wanting wrongly or destructively?  “Can a child indeed choose to 
do evil?” as American religious historian Margaret Bendroth asks.  “Perhaps,” she 
concludes, “our own times suggest the need to revisit an old and still deeply anguished 
question.”30   
Such questions are complicated by an important critique of parents and 
Christianity that has dominated much thinking on children in the past two decades.  Lead 
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by psychoanalyst Alice Miller and others who avidly took up her work, people have 
become acutely aware of the distorted use of children to meet adult needs as well as the 
dangers of religious justification for such abuse.31  Drawing on her work, several others 
have spelled out in great detail how biblical and Christian images are used to justify 
abusive patterns.32  However, in all this discussion a huge question stands unanswered.  If 
“much Christian theology has been rooted in the threat of punishment,” as Philip Greven 
argues,33 why has Christian theology paid so little attention to creating a more child-
friendly theology that sets new precedents for interactions with children?  Can an 
alternative course be drawn from scripture and other Christian sources, a course that 
provides a better means of guidance and discipline? Do Christian understandings of sin 
and love inherently lead to child abuse or can these doctrines be read in fresh ways to 
empower children and parents?     
Reconstructive efforts are especially needed in three broad areas: notions of sin, 
redemption, and children; ideas about children’s worth; and parenting as an important 
religious practice.  In the remainder of this paper, I focus only on the first.  I take up the 
other two at greater length elsewhere.34   
Given the amazingly destructive role doctrines of sin have played in condoning 
the harsh and abusive treatment and discipline of children, why jump into this thicket at 
all?  While we automatically react negatively to the idea of children as sinful or depraved, 
the history of the “depraved adultish-child” of premodern times and the “innocent 
childish-child” of modern times has shown the limits of both views.  The reign of the 
cherished, romanticized child created its own set of problems every bit as troubling as 
belief in the sinful, corrupt child had done.  A more complex understanding of sin and 
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grace therefore helps us move beyond the unfortunate dichotomy of the last several 
centuries between child as villain and child as victim, child as wholly depraved and child 
as wholly innocent.  It especially explains the moral and spiritual complexity of the teen 
years without pathologizing them.  Indeed, the theological concept gives children and 
adults a word and way to talk about betrayal of self, others, and God, an experience that 
they undoubtedly share. 
Second, if one can talk about sin, restoration, and children, one can then 
reconsider the complexities of moral and spiritual development, a topic familiar to many 
pre-Enlightenment theologians, but largely depleted of significant meaning today.  Prior 
to the turn to the Romantic child, many Christian theologians described the course of a 
child’s spiritual formation in rich and varied ways.  Although it comes as a surprise to our 
postmodern ears, these largely forgotten views add something missing in more recent 
psychological views.  Romanticized views freeze children in a sort of static childhood 
innocence threatened by external forces.  Current life cycle views in psychology divide 
development into stages of either increasing independence or increasing relationality—
enlightening but limited typologies of human nature.   
By contrast, classical Christian developmental schemes capture important 
dimensions of a child’s evolving moral and religious struggles.  They trace the dynamics 
of an incremental accretion of responsibility and make a place for human frailty, 
mistakes, and destructive failures.  These failures are not occasions for despair or 
unrelenting guilt but rather occasions for deeper moral and religious awakening, 
compassion, remorse, reparation, and formation.  This view contests the prevalent drive 
to perfect parenting and individual children.  It suggests a different approach, one that 
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includes a ready disclosure of shortcomings and the promise of reprieve.  A theological 
framework also suggests that adults in religious communities have broader 
responsibilities for the formation of children well beyond their own biological offspring.    
Finally, as this implies, historical notions of sin and children are far more 
complex and diverse than conventional negative stereotypes allow.  Oversimplified 
conceptions need to be challenged and corrected.  Not all allegations of evil in children 
are a form of religious contempt and abuse.  In some cases, as Marcia Bunge 
demonstrates in her exploration of an important German Pietist of the eighteenth century, 
Hermann Francke, the idea of original sin and redemption actually fostered the more 
humane treatment of children in general.  It motivated Francke to treat children with 
respect and kindness and, by leveling the playing field in which all are fallen, to extend 
such care to poor children in a deeply class-conscious society. 35  In a word, there is not a 
one-to-one correlation between ideas about original sin and harsh punishment of children.   
Augustine actually argues against physical reprimand, John Calvin does not advocate it, 
and even Jonathan Edwards, who calls children “young vipers,” does not talk about 
corporal punishment or “breaking the will” of sinful children.  Without denying the harm 
done in the name of Christianity and in the name of each of these figures by their 
followers, the weight of the theological tradition falls strongly on the side of the child. 
In an edited volume, The Child in Christian Thought, two authors actually devise 
their own terms to capture the nuance with which important theologians, Augustine in 
early Christianity (354-430) and Menno Simons as part of the Radical Reformation 
(1496-1561), talked about children as sinful.  In her work on Augustine, Martha Stortz 
suggests “non-innocence” as the best phrase to describe a third possibility that Augustine 
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assumed between innocence and depravity.  In Augustine’s eyes, an infant is willing but 
not yet capable of causing or strong enough to cause harm, literally not harming or “in–
nocens.”
36
  In a similar fashion but for a quite different Christian figure and period, Keith 
Graber Miller invents the phrase, “’complex innocence’” to capture Simon’s 
understanding of the “absence of both faithfulness and sinfulness in children,” an 
“‘innocence’ . . . tempered with the acknowledgement of an inherited Adamic nature 
predisposed toward sinning.”37 
Stortz does not skirt Augustine’s highly ambiguous historical legacy.  In the 
course of history, these same ideas were used to justify corporal punishment, as 
demonstrated by a later chapter in the same book on the harsh measures used by Jesuit 
and Ursuline missionaries in their work among the Huron Indians in Canada in the 
seventeenth century.  Still, although Augustine’s ideas led to later travesty, his own 
thinking was “remarkably nuanced.”  As Stortz’s describes it: 
He refused the romantic option of seeing children as completely innocent, born 
with a nature as pure as Adam’s before the Fall.  Equally he refused the cynic’s 
view of infants as miniature demons in desperate need of discipline.  Non-
innocence fairly characterizes his attitude toward infancy.  As they matured and 
acquired the abilities to speak and reason, children assumed a gradually increasing 
accountability for their actions.38 
Similarly, Simons develops his own understanding of an intermediary position between 
innocence and guilt, even though he does so for almost opposite theological purposes—as 
part of a bigger argument against, rather than for, infant baptism.  In the process of 
providing scriptural, theological, and practical arguments for the excellence of adult 
baptism, he distinguishes between “a nature predisposed toward sin and actual sinning, 
disallowing the former to obliterate childhood innocence and identifying only the latter as 
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that for which believers have responsibility before God.”39  A child’s “complex 
innocence” then entails the inborn tainted nature that becomes a graver cause for concern 
only as a child acquires the ability to discern and confess human frailty. 
Allowing for sin, in turn, permitted Augustine and Simons to describe the 
incremental moves from non-innocence or complex innocence to increased accountability 
and culpability.  Although Simons did not believe that moral and spiritual maturity 
always coincided with chronological markers, he held that parents had a serious 
obligation to watch for, recognize, cultivate, and celebrate the age of accountability.  
Augustine, by contrast, drew on common understandings of antiquity to create a quite 
sophisticated demarcation of the changing nature of sin and accountability through six 
stages from infancy to old age. 
If a grasping insatiability characterized infancy, disobedience is the notable sin of 
the second stage of life in which children acquire language, perceive adult expectations, 
and learn the rules.  In adolescence the non-innocence of infancy takes on an increasingly 
malicious form of "deliberate malice," most characteristically exemplified for Augustine 
in his own youthful foray with friends into a fruit garden, stealing pears prompted by 
nothing else than the "sheer delight of doing something wrong."  Here we have not just 
grasping desire or even outright disobedience but the infringement of a "certain bedrock 
equity in the world of human society,” a violation of basic human decency.40  Stortz 
identifies this developmental understanding as one of Augustine’s major contributions to 
contemporary considerations of children.  Her words are worth quoting at length: 
Augustine . . . recognized boundaries between the various stages of the life cycle 
and found in each stage a level of accountability that was chronologically and 
 21
experientially appropriate.  In particular, he evaluated the first stages of the life 
cycle in terms of increasing levels of moral accountability.  Although they were 
non-innocent, infants assumed little or no accountability: they had neither 
language nor reason.  It was fruitless to rebuke them because they could not 
understand language.  With the acquisition of language and reason came greater 
accountability.  He expected children to obey verbal commands and adolescents 
to understand the basic demands of human decency.  These graduated levels of 
accountability implied graver consequences for transgressions.  Looking back on 
a gang-stealing of pears, Augustine lamented the sins of his youth—but at least he 
knew when it was over! 
By contrast [without an understanding of sin and its gradations], we 
confuse the boundaries between infancy, childhood, and adulthood.  The 
Jonesboro shootings in March 1998 prompted a Texas legislator to propose 
extending the death penalty to eleven-year-olds.  Meanwhile, parents wander out 
of families and marriages to find people they should have located decades earlier: 
themselves.  They leave behind children who have probably spent their own 
adolescence parenting parents.  As a culture we are constantly blurring the 
distinctions between life stages.  We could learn from the boundaries Augustine 
saw and observed in the cycle of life.41  
 
In other words, the non-innocence of infancy, left unnoticed and untutored, is replicated, 
intensified, and amplified in the outright guilt of later stages of life.  
Several general observations can be made from this brief foray into classic texts.  
Describing virtue, accountability, and guilt in children is a daunting task.  We learn from 
Christian theology to do so nonetheless, but to proceed with fear and trepidation.  
Second, in this effort we do not get much help from scriptural accounts of Jesus’ life.  
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The New Testament simply does not make either child rearing or a child’s religious 
formation a topic of discussion.  The debates of church history about sin and baptism 
therefore have at least filled a gap in marking the child as a religious and moral being 
about to embark on a serious pilgrimage.  Moreover, this view stressed the critical 
obligation of the Christian community for bringing children to voluntary commitments of 
faith and discipleship.  Religious debates about children and sin then open up fresh 
avenues to discuss the radical understanding of parenting as a religious discipline and 
practice in its own right.  As in Simons’ worldview, discussions of sin and grace “utterly 
obligated parents and the Christian community to nurture children” in the faith.42  
Religious rituals must sanction the turning points of religious formation and criteria for 
discipline must correspond to a child’s gradual ability to speak, understand, discern, and 
incorporate good habits and virtues.  In other words, people must take the environment, 
the social and family context, and parental example and guidance seriously without 
absolving children of gradual responsibility for their own actions or undercutting the 
richness of their own developing moral and religious sensibilities.  
While many, many reasons lead children into trouble, the social sciences often 
picture the child as a victim of forces beyond her or his control, blaming parents and 
culture and choking out discussion of complicated questions about moral and religious 
formation.  The tendency to attribute evil to either heredity or the environment sometimes 
robs the child of responsibility, will, and freedom, overlooks the complexity of parenting, 
and ignores the richness of religious traditions that have attempted to understand the 
inherent, although not inevitable, nature of human frailty and brokenness. While many 
people have focused on the destructive consequences of Christian views of children and 
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the abuse performed in Christianity’s name, we must continue to plump the depths of an 
alternative course drawn from scripture and other Christian sources. 
As cherished conventions of childhood are upset and images of children and adult 
responsibilities multiply, articulating a fresh Christian reading on children and child 
rearing becomes more than a purely academic exercise.  It becomes a matter of 
contributing to a reinvention that is already well underway and in need of a richer variety 
of perspectives, including perspectives that might address moral and spiritual questions 
that many secular approaches overlook. 
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